Comment onJames Nelson ~ "Animals in 'Exemplary' Medical Research"

Letters to the Editors

is the threat of coercion undermining the free
giving of consent; to overcome this objection to
the use of prisoners, scientists would have to show
that certain rights of prisoners outside the experimental situation are not violated. Analogously, to
make the case for conscription of animals, scientists would have to work to protect their rights in
nonscientific contexts.
Exemplary research is research which is most
defensible ethically. Thus attention to the conditions under which research might be exemplary
is a promising route to pursue, though, as I have
argued, the specification of those conditions is
more difficult than appears at first. Once the
moral status of animals as beings with independent value is recognized, the position of
animals in exemplary research is nonetheless, as
Nelson has argued, ethically questionable, especially if we appeal to communal goods or obligations to the community to justify conscription.

Dear Editors:
The identification of my name under my article
"What A Jew Should Do," in BTS, Summer, 1989, with
the organization Jews for Jesus, struck me with the
same hilarity Mark Twain felt reading his obituary in a
newspaper. His response became memorable: "Reports
of my death have been wildly exaggerated." I wish I
could match that. My response will have to remain
standard, though it has an historical resonance:
I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of or
associated with Jews for Jesus. My organization is Jews
for Animal Rights. Our goals and methods are traditional and available to all Jews.
- Roberta Kalechofsky
Jews for Animal Rights
The Editors sincerely regret the foregoing error.
A Re.vly To My Critics

The nastiness of Professor Schwartz and a serious
misunderstanding on the part of Ms. Kalechofsky do
not inspire one to want to reply. I fear, however, that if
I say nothing, readers will be left with the impression
that I am unable to defend myself. Reluctantly, I begin.
It is true that I thought Schwartz was a "reform"
Jew but my article was not, as Ms. Kalechofsky claims,
based on the premise that Schwartz is "reform" and
Rabbi Bleich "orthodox." Much of my piece sketches a
history of the development of doctrine and it is during
that sketch that I try to make clear my basic premises,
which are as follows. Devout Jews need nothing more
than the Torah if they are intelligent as well as devout.
I painted a picture of the growth of the Mishnah and
Talmudic scholarship as the effort of certain Jews to
usurp the right of '1ay" Jews to think for themselves. I
drew an analogy with certain Catholic prohibitions
upon "laymen," circa 1000 C.E., not to read the Bible.
Implicit in my paper is the idea that there is no
injunction in the Torah itself to take the Mishnah and
Talmud as more holy or about as holy as Torah itself. I
presented excerpts from classical "sages" that strike
the unprejudiced Jew who has no axe to grind as
absurdities on their face. Example: that we may torture
a dead kings horse as a way of paying respect to him.
As a philosopher, I am committed to the idea that
people are only free when they stop slavishly accepting
the opinions of "greater persons" and think every
important issue through for themselves.

"Pastoral"
Chickens don't scratch in the yard;
their world is a crowded cell.
No need to peck at anything,
they haven't any beaks.
Sow is immobilized for life;
she's a living breakfast machine.
The horses stand like statues of bone,
with icicles on their hooves.
Cow is full of penicillin;
her baby's in a small, dark crate.
There is no Old MacDonald,
just a corporate plan for Hell.

-

Kathleen Malley
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and God's response toJob:

a "majority of rabbinic authorities" cite financial
benefit as a legitimate exception.
Schwartz is so upset by my mistaking him for a
"reform" Jew that he cares not a whit about the fact
that my review of his book was mainly positive
although entirely negative with respect to Bleich's
article. (Is he in black mood because I gave his entire
book only two and a half columns while devoting four
columns to the much shorter article by Bleich?) I am
deeply disappointed to learn, but no longer surprised
now that I know he is "orthodox," that Schwartz
thinks I should show more respect for Jewish scholarship - entirely ignoring the thrust of my article,
instead of rebutting it. Nowhere in his meanspirited
letter does Professor Schwartz try to grapple with my
arguments. Instead, he smugly takes the moral high
ground, rapping me on my knuckles and taking me to
task for my failure to be submissively reverent towards
the "greats." Swelling his chest up with pride, he
announces we should not write off people like Bleich
but strive to make them aware of a better worldview.
He finishes off his heap of abuse upon me and his non
sequiturs by asking 'Well then, what should a Jew do?"
and answering his own question with "Certainly not
write articles with the negative assumptions and implications of Gendin." After such a tiring display of selfrighteousness at my stylistic infelicities, little wonder
that Schwartz has no energy left to deal with the substance of my claims.
Schwartz seems to think I should be keeping up
with all the writings he and his opponent, Bleich, are
producing. He says Bleich now claims that it isn't evil
to be a vegetarian. Thanks, David, I wish I had known
you have undergone a change of heart because up
until now I had been having trouble sleeping.
Schwartz thinks I should have reviewed the 1988, not
1982, edition of his book. I reviewed the 1982 edition
because that is what the editors of this journal forwarded to me for review. What have you added,
Professor? What have you withdrawn? Nobody is
perfect; please tell us what mistakes you corrected. Or
is the "expansion" you boast of merely a matter of
adding more recipes? Is my criticism of your appeal to
the Talmud, together with my supporting reason, no
longer applicable? If so, you could have spared us your
grouchiness and pointed to the improvements in the
latest edition.
-Sidney Gendin
Eastern Michigan University

Does the hawk soar by your wisdom
And stretch her wings towards the south
Does the eagle mount at your command?
If not now, very certainly in the near future, the
answer to that question will be "Yes." Will the
morning stars sing at this creation? Or do we look
forward to it with dread, knowing - to paraphrase Camus - that he who knows everything
can destroy everything.
Buber commented that in the Bible the natural
world is created with a blessing, but the historical
world is created with a curse. It is from the historical world of injustice that Job cries out for
vindication. It is with arguments from the natural
world that God justifies Himself against Job's
attacks, but it is against nature that we make our
prolonged war; our work is cut out for a long
time to come, and our siege-works are prepared,
while the historical world still remains cursed.
The most radical texts for our time may be the
Book ofJob and that quirky, inchoate fable, "The
Tower of Babel."

Letters to the Editors (Continuedfrom page 210)
These constitute the background and the premises I
used to argue that David Bleich never even once tries
to give us reasons why we may eat animals and experiment upon them. Throughout his essay, he is content
merely to quote "sages" and "authorities" (as he routinely refers to them) who believe abuses of animals to
be justified. I began my essay by pointing out that I am
troubled by words like "authority" and "official" and
claimed they were disguises to lend weight to otherwise lightweight ideas. If I am snide, as Schwartz
claims, it is not so much directed at the sages but at
Bleich. I hold passionate opinions about animals and I
am not apologetic for adopting a tone of disrespect
towards a man who thinks it is necessary to eat
animals and "proves" his point by saying that that is
what Maimonides believed. I explained why
Maimonides' view was foolish even at the time he was
writing. I am irritated at a person (Bleich) who thinks
he can show the principle of tz'ar ba'alei hayyim (cause
no pain to living creatures) is not violated when
animals are made to suffer for financial benefit because
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life because whereas animals can feel as whole individuals, plants, together with rocks and other "inanimate" landscape features, can feel only in their
microscopic parts, or "cells." Hartshorne ascribes sentient indiViduality to cells and other microscopic
entities, based on empirical science's observation that
these things show signs of sensitivity to the environment. At the same time he denies sentient individuality to whole plants, based on empirical science's
failure to locate a nervous system in them. Barad summarizes Hartshorne/Dombrowski: "Plants, like rocks,
are multicellular organisms, and so are sentient in their
parts. But as a whole individual, a plant is not sentient,
since it lacks a nervous system" (p. 162, column 1).
This argument is confusing. For one thing, not only
do cells and other microscopic entities show signs of
sensitivity to the environment; so do whole plants, as
any lay observer can note. Secondl)" if the case for sentience rests upon the observation of a nervous system,
what evidence is there that individual cells or other
microscopic entities have one? I don't understand how
Hartshorne can logically ascribe sentience to cells,
based on the argument that they show signs of sensitivity to the environment even though they do not
indicate the presence of a nervous system, yet deny
sentience to whole plants using the nervous system criterion while ignoring the fact that they, too, can be seen
responding to the environment as whole individuals.
Why should plants, which display all the major signs
of organic similitude to animals (the principles of centrality and growth, vital cellular behavior, DNA
structure and activity, nutritional needs, etc.) be identified in Hartshorne's, or anyone's, metaphysics more
closely with rocks than with other, unquestionable, life
forms?
To repeat, on this point I differ from Barad in
finding Hartshorne to be neither logically nor empirically persuasive; and am left wondering, once again,
why academic philosophy, even when it is ethically
oriented towards the natural environment, as in the
case of Hartshorne/Dombrowski, is so petrified when
it comes to the plant world. It is very irksome as I
noted in my review in The Animals' Agenda, to find
Hartshorne and Dombrowski both patronizing
Wordsworth, whom they admire for many of his other
gifted insights, for having intuitively imagined that
twigs can somehow enjoy a breeze.
- Karen Davis
University of Maryland

Dear Editors:
One would have thought that, since 1982 when
Carol Gilligan published her work on the differences
between male and female moral development, we
would have been done forever with gross genderneutral statements about human ethical behavior and
development. Julie Dunlap's article on ''The Adolescent as Environmental Ethicist" (Spring, 1989)
shows, however, that the problem still persists, merely
assuming an unfortunate new twist. Although Dunlap
cannot but acknowledge that boys and girls demonstrate different moral attitudes, her solution is simply
to omit studying girls!
Dunlap does note in passing that the results of her
study should not be generalized to the moral thinking
of females, adding that such research is "essential to
develop a comprehensive understanding of adolescents' moral reasoning about animals." However,
despite this token caveat, she goes on to conclude her
piece with claims about the "normal process of
childhood development" and the struggles of children to
define their moral obligations" (emphasis added).
Dunlap, moreover, apparently sees no problem in
assigning a gender-neutral title to her boys-only
research - Le. ''The Adolescent as Environmental
Ethicist." Had Dunlap accurately entitled her article
''The Male Adolescent as Environmental Ethicist" one
would still be disturbed that girls have been excluded
from ethical investigation yet one more time. But at
least this title would not have claimed more for her
study than it really is - namely, just another study
about only boys.
- Marti Kheel
Feminists for Animal Rights

Dear Editors:
Having reviewed Daniel Dombrowski's Hartshorne
and the Metaphysics of Animal Rights for The Animals'
Agenda (June 1989), I was doubly interested in what
Judith Barad had to say about the book (BTS, Summer
1989). Our responses differ at points, but I would like
to call attention to a rather wide divergence on a particular issue. While Barad finds Hartshorne/
Dombrowski's distinction between plant sentience and
animal sentience ontologically convincing, I find it
mystifying. Hartshorne maintains that there is more
cosmic and spiritual value in animal life than in plant
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